Current export control policies, drafted during the Cold War, require reassessment in light of fundamental changes in the international security environment. The interconnectedness of the global economy, brought about by new technologies that facilitate international collaboration and knowledge sharing, is challenging the American export control framework. Underlying is a tension between the needs for innovation, driven by the free exchange of ideas, and security needs, aiming to prevent potentially sensitive knowledge and hardware from falling into the wrong hands. Academic space research institutions are particularly affected by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) United States Munitions List, which controls broad categories of space systems. Many members of the academic community champion a reactionary approach whereby restricting research in a given area requires that a risk be demonstrated. This stands in contrast to the precautionary approach towards the proliferation of space technology embodied in the ITAR wherein the risk of technology transfer is mitigated through the liberal use of restrictions, controls and State Department oversight. Effective export controls must balance the benefits of requiring that certain technologies be used exclusively by certain U.S. interests with the danger of undermining future innovation. A notional model, supported by interviews and analyses, describes the long-and short-term effects of ITAR upon national security. The notional model provides valuable insight into the dynamics of short-and long-term national security needs and the influence of export control on those needs. Further refinement of the model will allow the influence of potential changes in ITAR procedures to be evaluated and understood. The effects on national security of strengthening or relaxing components of export restrictions can be understood through an expansion of the model and by holding interviews with a variety of stakeholders involved in the innovation, legislation, and enforcement processes.
I. Introduction
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the national security implications of exporting technology with military applications have concerned the United States. Apprehension over the export of technology stems from the fear that those devices could one day be used against the United States or its interests. During the Cold War, the United States' unease over the export of technology was focused on the export of hardware that could potentially be used by the Soviet Union. As a result of these security concerns, the United States created a strict export control regime to both assess the potential threats caused by exported technology and to restrict exports as needed.
Today's security and technological environments are dramatically different from those of the Cold War. The United States no longer faces one single threat, but must protect itself from a variety of possible adversaries, including nations and terrorists. Additionally, sharing information between nations is facilitated by the increased ease with which information is communicated. Information can be transferred to a potential threat with the click of a mouse, the scan of an airline ticket, or the push of a mobile phone button.
As a result of shifts in the world economy, the United States adapted export control laws to respond to potential security threats posed by the export of technical information. Current United States policy with respect to the export of nonphysical, technical information is identical to the regulations governing the export of technical hardware. The potential risks posed by the export of hardware are often clear. The security risks associated with the export of information, however, are often more difficult to assess because of imperfect understanding regarding potential uses of exported data. The uncertainty surrounding this risk potential has inspired significant debate.
These social changes have heavily impacted scientific institutions, which seek to provide public benefit through the sharing of information and the creation of new technologies. Export control laws have affected space research in particular because of the international nature of space research and the military applicability of many space technologies. The aspect of export control most relevant to space research is the Department of State's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which regards all satellites and most space systems as munitions, subject to export control and licensing restrictions.
The uncertainty surrounding the potential security risks inherent in academic space research activities can be addressed in two ways: a precautionary approach and a reactionary approach. The main difference between these two solutions stems from dissimilar perceptions of risk. A precautionary stance to national security is one in which a decision maker deems a potential, but as yet unrealized, risk as important and responds by using restrictions and controls to mitigate any chance of future risk. Since the Cold War, the United States has primarily relied on precautionary policy by restricting the export of technical hardware. In following with past practice, the United States has adopted the same restrictive policy to handle the current potential security threats inherent in the transfer of technical space-based information.
The second response to future threats is a reactionary stance, or a "proof-before-action" policy. The basis of a reactionary stance is that present threats should be eliminated if they exist; however, there must be proof of the existence of future threats before regulations or restrictions are developed. In a reactionary stance, the decision maker understands the potential for future risk, but is willing to accept that risk in return for less oversight and control. Academic institutions traditionally take on a more reactionary stance with respect to the potential risk from the export of technical information. Many of today's universities hold that the United States government's precautionary stance on the export of technical information is preventing universities from doing cutting-edge research and broadening the general understanding of science, engineering, and technology. This paper focuses on ITAR's effects on academic space research at U.S. universities, describes different policies and points of view that have been implemented to deal with the presence of risk, and makes recommendations to balance the needs for space research and national security in the context of ITAR. Specific attention is given to the relationship and the nature of the interactions between academic research institutions and the federal government.
II. Significance of Export Control in National Security
The United States enjoys primacy in military affairs around the globe due in large part to the relative strength of its scientific and engineering establishment. The U.S. military is able to apply a wide array of technologicallyenabled tools in conventional engagements and nuclear deterrence. This technological superiority today stems from the World War II era experience that investment in scientific research and development can win wars.
Recent conflicts in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan dramatically illustrate the prowess of the United States military against conventional military forces. The United States' ability to leverage technology enables the U.S. to outmatch potential adversaries in military capability while committing far fewer troops to the conflict. Globally, the U.S. National Security Council is provided unmatched power projection capabilities by stealth aircraft, global positioning system (GPS) guided munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, nuclear submarines, and ten carrier battle groups. 1 The relative scientific advantage enjoyed by the United States is a critical enabler of our military capabilities. Space technology in particular has become a vital component of the United States military. The U.S. military utilizes space for many key aspects of military operations: communications; navigation; missile warning; weather forecasting; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Satellites are efficient means to collect, transmit, and distribute information to the warfighter. 2 Foreign entities employ a variety of techniques to glean militarily applicable knowledge from the United States. Knowledge transfer may occur through covert actions as well as overt methods. Whether channeled through illegal purchases of equipment from third party nations and industrial espionage by foreign agents or through academic exchanges and open literature, technology transfers can be militarily significant. Regulations must, therefore, uphold the national security interests of the United States. Four steps compose the process of diffusion of technology to a state's potential adversaries: 3 1. Development of an awareness of existing information and/or hardware 2. Transfer of information and/or hardware 3. Absorption of knowledge into indigenous innovation 4. Improvement of foreign entity's military strength Given the synergies between commercial and civil space activities, and military and intelligence space activities, space research institutions are rich targets where foreign nations may acquire critical U.S. scientific knowledge, hardware designs, and technical skills. Furthermore, by monitoring the status of U.S. progress in various space system technologies, foreign nations are better able to allocate resources to counter U.S. space capabilities. 4 In addition to the diffusion of national security technology to foreign nations, the September 11 th attacks introduced a new security environment in which the asymmetric threats of terrorism became a fixture in U.S. society. Although terrorism had struck the United States before, 9/11 increased the consequences of the threat by several orders of magnitude. This event fundamentally changed the risk preferences of decision makers in government and, in doing so, the enforcement of U.S. export control policy. Terrorism may or may not alter the underlying rationale for ITAR restrictions. 5 Proponents of the reactionary perspective point out that ITAR covers weapons that terrorists have not used to date and may not ever use due to the complexity entailed in creating, transporting, and deploying them successfully.
Proponents of the precautionary perspective respond to 9/11 by demanding more stringent ITAR regulations. From the precautionary perspective, the threat of terrorist organizations buying or stealing weapons of mass destruction underscores the need to curb proliferation, including more stringent export control policy. In contrast to rogue states, terrorist regimes are unlikely to develop indigenous technologies. However, terrorists are certainly capable of buying or stealing technologically enabled weapons systems and then gaining training in those systems through the export of information. As such, it is in the interests of the United States to limit the proliferation of weapons technology and training.
Over the last decade the United States has fought brilliant military engagements against conventional military forces in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The success in these conventional conflicts can be traced to the revolution in military affairs (i.e., the application of modern science and engineering to weapons technology). The military importance of scientific superiority is now recognized both in the U.S. and by potential adversaries around the world. The rise of the threat of terrorism increases the scope of technologies applicable to protecting American citizens but does not alter the need for export controls. Protecting a strong, technologically enabled innovation system in the United States is necessary to maintaining primacy in global military affairs.
III. Legal Mechanisms
The previous section elaborated the need for the U.S. to control the exports of technologies that may be used against U.S. interests. The United States Congress has recognized this need and has taken the precautionary step of creating an export control regime. This section focuses on the legislative authority and legal mechanisms of ITAR and presents its key concepts as well as the formal and informal political process of ITAR.
A. Key Concepts in ITAR 1. The Arms Export Control Act and the United States Munitions List
The arms export control act (AECA) of 1976 recognized the need for the United States to control the spread of weapons technologies and gave the Executive Branch the authority to designate items considered defense articles or services. 6 This act enabled the creation of ITAR, and the designated items constitute the United States Munitions
List administered on behalf of the President by the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. ITAR nominally serves as a mechanism by which the U.S. government may limit the export of technology and information to foreign nations and nationals that might use those exports against U.S. interests. The United States Munitions List (USML), mandated by the AECA, provides insight into the scope of exports that are prohibited by ITAR. The USML is divided into twenty-one Categories ranging from firearms and assault weapons to protective personnel equipment and shelters. Category IV, "Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs and Mines", and Category XV, "Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment", are of particular interest to space research since they include such items as ground control stations for telemetry, tracking, and control; radiation-hardened microelectronics; rockets; all satellites; launch vehicles and their power plants; and perhaps most importantly for researchers, all related technical data.
7, 8 The breadth of the USML leaves room for individual interpretations by enforcement agents within the State Department and, hence, uncertainty in the minds of those who are conducting research that may be related to these technologies. Broadly speaking, the AECA and ITAR are aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons from the United States to other, potentially hostile nations, individuals or organizations. With some exceptions, ITAR requires a license for the export of military information, technologies, and equipment to some foreign nations, organizations, and citizens and prohibits outright the transfer of such technology to others. 9 Projects which employ foreign nationals from any of these countries are therefore subject to added scrutiny with respect to international arms export restrictions. In order to export an item that appears on the USML, one must obtain an ITAR export license from the State Department unless one qualifies for a licensing exemption. 10 For most academics, the most important ITAR license exception is the fundamental research exemption.
The Fundamental Research Exemption
The fundamental research exemption releases defense exports from the ITAR regulations when those services are in support of fundamental research and conducted by accredited U.S. institutes of higher education.
11 Both the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush administrations have affirmed this exemption. 12, 13 Although it is clear that an exemption exists for fundamental research, a significant portion of the debate and researchers' uncertainty surrounding ITAR revolve around the definition of "fundamental research". ITAR defines "fundamental research" as "basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community.…" However, if researchers accept any restrictions on the publication of their work or if the U.S. government funds the research and mandates controls protecting the information, then the exemption does not apply.
14 An important distinction regarding the fundamental research exemption exists between the export of information and the export of hardware. This is critical because the exemption covers information, and not hardware. (Hardware is exempt under certain circumstances, discussed below.)
Other Exemptions
Other exemptions relevant to academic researchers include an amendment to ITAR that was published in the Federal Register on March 29, 2002. This amendment loosens licensing restrictions for accredited institutions of higher learning exporting satellite hardware and other Category XV items to members of NATO, the European Union, the European Space Agency, and major non-NATO allies for the purposes of fundamental research. These institutions are largely exempt from licensing requirements given that they broadly publish their results and the designs of the exported hardware.
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B. Formal and Informal Political Process of ITAR
One of the significant complexities of ITAR is the dynamic of the political process that governs the regulation. Whereas ITAR regulates space technology, the formal political process for determining those regulations involves many stakeholders within the government as well as in public and private institutions. Although the military and commercial space industries also have a vested interest in the regulations, their influence will only be discussed in the context of academic space research. The various stakeholders are shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Stakeholders in ITAR Political Process
The direct governmental actors in the export control process consist primarily of the Executive and Legislative Branches. Three departments publish export control regulations: the Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, and the Department of State. In the Legislative Branch, Congress assigns authority to different agencies in the Executive Branch to enforce and craft different aspects of export control. Review of export control is also conducted by congressional committees and coordinated with congressional committee staff. Outside of the federal government, research institutions and industry are affected by export regulations.
There is also an informal policy dynamic that operates to shape ITAR. This process involves the role of congressional committee staff, civil servants in the State Department, and lobbying groups. While not formally defined as government procedure, the interactions at this level are just as important to creating regulations. At they same time, they are often mired in bureaucracy. Because ITAR regulations are not a publicly prominent issue, there is little political incentive for influential members of Congress or the administration to address their effectiveness. In such a political climate, most attention given to ITAR is by political staffers, such as congressional committee staffers, civil servants in the State Department, and deputy personnel in the Executive Branch. At this level of government process, there is little incentive or ability to quickly investigate or decisively change export control and national security policies.
IV. Innovation in Research Institutions and the Free Exchange of Knowledge
In contrast to the risk-averse precautionary approach taken by most defense officials toward export control, members of the academic community overwhelmingly support a reactionary stance, requiring strong evidence that a risk exists before acting to protect against it. Dr. M.R.C. Greenwood, Chancellor of the University of CaliforniaSanta Cruz, summarized her reactionary perspective in testimony given before the House Committee on Science. "Trying to put into place new restrictions to prevent research in areas where an imaginary scenario might suggest a danger is probably not productive. We should consider new areas of classification only where there are real agreedupon threats." 16 A report by the American Association of University Professors charges the government with demonstrating "the particular threat to which the [proposed] measure is intended to respond, not as a matter of fear, conjecture, or supposition, but as a matter of fact." 17 The reactionary view insists on finding a demonstrative, causal link between the open exchange of intellectual capital and the erosion of U.S. national security before it will freely accept any impediment to that flow. This worldview strives to protect academic freedom as an enabler of research.
A. Universities and Collaboration
The Role of Openness in University Research
The necessity of openness in academic institutions has been long held vital by the academic community and long challenged in times of war. In 1943 the American Association of University Professors published a report arguing for the protection of academic freedom in wartime noting, "freedoms lost are difficult to regain." 18 Most research institutions in the United States list academic freedom in their core values. MIT recently rearticulated this value in a report addressing growing concerns over export control: "Education and scholarship are best served through the unconstrained sharing of information and by creating the opportunities for free and open communication."
19 Dr. Sheila Widnall, Institute Professor at MIT and former Secretary of the Air Force, makes the argument that openness is the basis for peer review and criticism, which is necessary for intellectual excellence. "Cut off from such criticism
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The and challenge, science deteriorates, subject to political rather than scientific judgments, producing fads, junk science and wishful thinking." 20 
Innovation in a Global Society
The concept of innovation invokes the dual qualities of originality and practicality. Innovation is distinct from invention in that it is able to immediately impact the world. The Council on Competitiveness, comprised of the presidents or CEOs of Stanford, MIT, the National Science Foundation, IBM Corporation, General Motors, and others, argued that "[w]here we once optimized our organizations for efficiency and quality, we must optimize our entire society for innovation." 21 Proponents of this viewpoint argue that optimizing for innovation requires international collaboration.
This collaboration is on the rise in many science and engineering fields. Many indicators show an increase in global cooperation among scientists. U.S. scientists publish more than four times the amount of internationally coauthored articles than any other country, about eighteen percent of all articles. 22 The wide availability of cheap telecommunications has greatly increased the distance over which collaborators can work. 23 The aerospace industry is especially tied to the international community. More than half of the money spent by the federal government in Fiscal Year 1997 on international collaboration was spent on aerospace. 24 Innovation in aerospace relies on international collaboration. The contributions of foreign students and faculty within the United States are, therefore, critical as enablers of international relationship building and innovation.
ITAR's Impact on Foreign Students
International students comprise a significant proportion of the U.S. graduate student population, especially in science and engineering-related fields. Table 1 shows the percentage of graduate students in engineering, by specialty, from 1994 to 2001. Overall, foreign students have steadily increased their representation in engineering, from twenty-seven percent in 1994 to forty-one percent in 2001. The percentage of foreign students specifically within aerospace engineering is slightly higher than within other engineering disciplines. These figures do not reflect any change in the number of foreign students experienced after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Many foreign nationals choose to remain in the United States after completing their graduate studies. Table 2 shows the postgraduate plans of foreign doctoral students studying engineering in 2002. Aerospace had the highest percentage of foreign students remaining in the U.S., at eighty-five percent. Although these figures are promising, a significant number of foreign aerospace workers are unable to obtain the security clearances needed to make a significant contribution to the U.S. aerospace industry.
29 ITAR restricts the work of foreign nationals both in university and industry settings.
Under ITAR, disclosing sensitive information to a foreign national within the United States is defined as an export and is banned. 30 This restriction does not apply to fundamental research protected by NSDD-189, but federal research awards have increasingly included "troublesome clauses" that prohibit foreign students from working on 31 Universities were more likely to accept restrictions on foreign nationals than publication restrictions. 32 Rejecting research contracts due to troublesome clauses has economic consequences for universities and may disproportionately affect smaller universities that are averse to rejecting funding.
B. ITAR and Socioeconomics
ITAR may disproportionately affect universities with relatively small research budgets. Understanding ITAR and its implications for research, determining whether or not a particular project is covered by ITAR, and resisting restrictive clauses in research contracts require both a personnel and financial commitment by a university. An informal survey conducted in 2002 of 129 institutions that receive more than $500,000 per year in NASA funding probed the schools on their ITAR compliance. The survey concluded that schools generally fall into three categories. The schools with the most NASA funding generally understand the ramifications of ITAR and have the staff to comply (e.g., MIT, Stanford, and Cal Tech). Schools who receive moderate NASA funding understand ITAR but were so deterred by the possible penalties and bureaucracy that they frequently chose not to conduct any research under ITAR's purview. The final tier of schools included those who received the least amount of NASA funding. They were found not to understand ITAR and possibly violate it every day. 33 Schools that do attempt to conduct research covered by ITAR face the remaining challenges of determining whether or not components of the proposed project are on the US Munitions List and also negotiating research contracts free of restrictive clauses.
ITAR is generally crafted, meaning that the technologies listed on the United States Munitions List are often broad categories rather than specific machinery. In order for an institution to decide if an item in a proposed research program is on the Munitions List, that institution must consult attorneys with technical knowledge and experience, possibly outside expert counsel. Alternatively, the institution must ask the government for an official jurisdiction determination. Large research universities such as MIT have attorneys on staff and, when necessary, are willing to pay outside consultants who generally charge between $400 and $500 per hour. 34 A final recourse available to all universities is a commodity jurisdiction (CJ) ruling from the Department of State. This ruling unambiguously determines whether the U.S. Munitions List covers an item, however obtaining a CJ normally requires at least half a semester. 35 Smaller universities do not have the resources to keep export control attorneys on staff or to hire outside consultants and so often must ask for a CJ ruling. 36 Because of the long lead-time associated with obtaining a CJ, this puts smaller schools at a distinct disadvantage. Even if research is covered under the US Munitions List, institutions must undergo several more steps of analysis to decide whether or not a license is needed.
Because research conducted subject to export control laws is often considered sensitive by the US government, the contracts sometimes include clauses that restrict open research publication and/or the employment of foreign nationals. Due to such clauses, MIT has turned down more than three million dollars in research contracts within the past two years. 37 The University of California at Berkeley similarly rejected half a million dollars from the Army Corps of Engineers rather than submit to foreign national restrictions. 38 However, both MIT and UC-Berkeley spend well over four hundred million dollars each year on research, meaning the rejected contracts are less than one percent of their total research budgets. 39 Smaller universities with yearly research expenditures on the order of ten million dollars can hardly afford to turn down multi-million dollar projects regardless of the restrictions. Some state assisted schools also receive pressure to accept research contracts with restrictive phrases especially if the state has an aggressive development plan. 40 While some universities are reticent to accept ITAR contracts because of the added legal hassle, individual principal investigators are likewise deterred from ITAR contracts by the threat of punishment if they violate the regulations.
C. Liability for Violations
Criminal violations of ITAR are punishable by fines of up to one million dollars, imprisonment up to ten years, or both. 41 This punishment can be levied against universities and individual principal investigators. When asked if MIT would protect its employees if they were charged with a violation of ITAR, the Office of Sponsored Programs replied that they would provide for the defense of the Principal Investigator as long as the employee had acted in good faith. 42 However, this policy is not formally stated either by MIT or most other universities conducting ITAR research. 43 Professors interviewed for this project at a variety of universities were wary of personal criminal prosecution or civil liability even though the State Department has to date not found any university researchers guilty of violating ITAR.
V. Determinants of ITAR Policy
The following sections describe some additional dynamics of export control policy. Addressing these dynamics may have important ramifications for future constructive changes to the existing export control regime.
A. Resolving Ambiguities Surrounding ITAR
Several ambiguities surrounding ITAR have had an impact upon the climate in which academic research is conducted. A number of professors in space research-related fields independently noted that ITAR regulations have compelled them to think twice about engaging in international collaboration and hiring foreign students for projects that may be ITAR-controlled. In each case, the issue was linked to a climate of uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of ITAR regulations, which motivated the faculty in question to take a risk-averse approach to working with foreign nationals. This risk aversion is undoubtedly exacerbated by researchers' fears that, if they were found to be in violation of ITAR, they would be subject to personal civil and criminal prosecution, even for goodfaith errors. This tends to produce a climate unfavorable to innovation and unwelcoming to foreign colleagues. Increased clarity of procedures defining the circumstances under which a violator of ITAR is subject to prosecution might alleviate these concerns while simultaneously removing some ambiguity faced by State Department staffers, potentially reducing licensing time.
Ambiguity Surrounding the Fundamental Research Exemption
From the point of view of the academic research community, it is often unclear when export control licenses are necessary. Much of the uncertainty surrounding this issue may be traced to ambiguity in the fundamental research exemption. Although NSDD-189 guarantees an exemption for practitioners of fundamental research, the definition of fundamental research is considered to be vague by many researchers, senior administration of research institutions, and government officials. The April 16, 2004 Interagency report of the Offices of Inspector General expresses concern that "the definition of 'fundamental research' may be vague and unclear, and that the decision appears to rest on the publishability of the research and whether publication restrictions exist." 44 This concern is supported by the ITAR definition of fundamental research which states that "University research will not be considered fundamental research if …the University or its researchers accept other restrictions on publication of scientific and technical information resulting from the project or activity." 45 Redefinition of the term "fundamental research" would alleviate this problem if publishability were no longer a criterion. OMB Circular A-11 provides such a definition, drawing a distinction between basic research, applied research, and development. 46 In accordance with NSDD-189, defining "fundamental research" to include all basic and applied research that is not classified may help to harmonize categorical definitions of research within the government and thereby alleviate some of the uncertainty surrounding these definitions.
The Consequences of Removing the Fundamental Research Exemption
The Interagency Report suggests that the fundamental research exemption be reexamined "on the grounds these exemptions might allow the transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to countries or entities of concern." 47 The American Association of Universities and the Council on Governmental Relations decry these recommendations, stating that:
The State IG recommendations for compliance program best practices include: 1) automated export tracking systems, which include information on foreign nationals' visa and export license expirations and the export-controlled technology the foreign national is exposed to; 2) detailed site visitor request forms, which provide sufficient personal information about the prospective visitor for project managers, export control officials, and security personnel to make informed visitor authorization determinations; 3) unique badging that easily identifies foreign employees and visitors and automatically restricts access to work areas; and 4) automated export control training and testing systems that provide ITAR basic and refresher training with competency scores, remedial testing for failed attempts, automated record keeping, and assurance that tests were completed prior to issuance of access control badges. These recommendations are very much based on a company model, as opposed to a university model. In our view, these practices are inappropriate and impossible to implement in an open research and learning environment characteristic of, and essential to, universities. 48 In the event that the fundamental research exemption were to be lifted, the export-controlled laboratory would be compelled to badge all entrants, restrict foreign nationals, and require that researchers not engaged in researchrelated conversation where foreign nationals might overhear. These actions stand in stark opposition to the traditional atmosphere of academic openness as well as the spirit of the NSDD-189. Many universities refuse to allow such a closed atmosphere on campus.
Sensitive but Unclassified Information
Ambiguity resulting from the lack of a clear definition of fundamental research is most vividly illustrated by situations involving the use of clauses such as "Sensitive but Unclassified" (SBU) and "For Official Use Only" (FOUO). Often, contracts that utilize such language incorporate publication restrictions that would violate the fundamental research exemption in ITAR. 49 This fact is often not clear to the researchers in the academic community, particularly in universities that do not have significant experience handling ITAR regulations. Thus, it is not uncommon for researchers to unknowingly be in violation of ITAR. This cultivates an atmosphere of risk aversion. Furthermore, "There is no uniformity in implementing rules throughout the government on the use of SBU. Agencies also may assign various criminal and civilian penalties to improper release of 'sensitive but unclassified' information." 50 Since SBU has no clear legal status, there is considerable ambiguity surrounding its use. It is further worth noting that the use of clauses such as SBU opposes the spirit of the NSDD-189, which clearly articulates that "…where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally funded fundamental research in science, technology and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification" rather than an ill-defined intermediate level.
51 MIT President Charles M. Vest articulates this concern as follows: "It is the ambiguity and uncertainty of what is inappropriate to publish, or in the use by the government of ill-defined terms like 'sensitive but unclassified', that creates danger for the scientific enterprise and invites bad decisions." 52 As such, MIT has refused to accept contracts containing SBU clauses and similar language at the cost of millions of dollars in contracts. 53 This policy is best articulated by the testimony of MIT Institute Professor Sheila Widnall:
…Increasingly, MIT has seen the attempt by government contracting officials to include a requirement that research results be reviewed, prior to publication, for the potential disclosure of "sensitive" information. Such a request implies potential restrictions on the manner in which research results are handled and disseminated, and may also restrict the personnel who have access to this material. The difficulty with this approach is that the term "sensitive" has not been defined, and the obligations of the Institute and the individuals involved have not been clarified nor bounded. This situation opens the Institute and its faculty, students, and staff to potential arbitrary dictates from individual government contract monitors--however well intended. To date, MIT has refused, in all cases, to accept this restriction in any of its government contracts. 54 Other members of the academic community have echoed this sentiment. For example, one prominent university official expressed that the major problem with the SBU designation lies in its ambiguity and that creating a procedure for defining and dealing with SBU information might ameliorate the situation. Another official stated that SBU should simply not be used, even with a clear procedure, since it introduces uncertainty regarding what would otherwise be a clear-cut distinction between classified and unclassified information. Clarifying the meaning of SBU and other related phrases could resolve this ambiguity for academia as well as for the State Department and the rest of the Executive Branch, thereby allowing for increased trust and transparency in communication between the academic research and national security communities.
Review of the United States Munitions List
As previously stated, the United States Munitions List is characterized by the successive addition of new technologies as they emerge. In addition, those policymakers who updated the USML are generally not technically educated and therefore only specify ranges of technologies to be controlled. This sort of incremental policy adjustment has resulted in a list that is, from a technical perspective, as ambiguous as it is broad. One mechanism to improve the United States Munitions List, as suggested by the Aerospace Industries Association, is to conduct a review of the USML aimed at resolving the significant ambiguities within it. Although the USML was last amended on May 21 st , 2004, these updates were incremental in nature. 55 The current USML covers a wide range of technologies, many of which are available on the open market from other nations. Refinement of the USML to include only those items that are critical to maintaining US national security will help to decrease the administrative load of the Department of State staffers while allowing more researchers to proceed without the need for a license. Ideally, this review process would be institutionalized such that it would occur on a regular basis, thereby keeping the USML lean and up-to-date. 56 Furthermore, this process should be open to input from the academic and industrial communities so as to increase transparency and to take advantage of their unique experiences.
B. The ITAR Approval Process
Due to the broad nature of items on the United States Munitions List, research institutions that have the capability must determine whether elements of a given research project fall under the purview of export control. For universities, this results in the requirement to request dozens of licenses, and some notable administrators fear that this could increase to hundreds in the future, which would be unmanageable by their current process. 57 This process increases the administrative load on research officials as well as State Department officials who must approve the license. License approval can take about two months. This delay is a long period of time in the academic research cycle where students may only be working on a project for an academic year of nine months and must complete their degree requirements, such as a thesis, within that timeframe.
Evaluating Projects at the Funding Stage
The practical effect of the ITAR licensing requirement has been that the burden rests on research contract recipients to comply with export control. In order to do this, they must first recognize the necessity for licensure and then determine if specific elements of a research contract must be export controlled. A short-term solution proposed in a Congressional Research Service report advocates a shift in that burden to the federal government to evaluate the security sensitivity of a research project at the funding stage. 58 However, the report cites a probable lack of support from the scientific community, who are not likely to accept research proposals that would have publication limits imposed.
There is an argument to be made for evaluating the need for export control at the funding stage. Otherwise, compliance with ITAR must then be monitored while a project is already underway. Some scientists are not aware of the security implications of their work, and security professionals are not always able to distinguish between the sensitive and the insignificant technologies associated with a scientific field. To fill this gap, many universities communicate export control requirements to researchers, but there is still a lack of communication between scientists, industry, and government security professionals about export control.
Because funding agencies currently take responsibility for evaluating projects and applying for licenses, both funding administrators and principal investigators are potentially liable for violations of ITAR. Although no university officials have been prosecuted to date, the fear of prosecution is strong among several researchers interviewed.
Improving Communication
In addition to licensing specific individuals, there is a need to improve the understanding of ITAR requirements in the University community in general. Building a strong dialogue between government and space research institutions would improve the effectiveness of ITAR by reducing the risk of inadvertent knowledge transfer. For example, the Council on Government Regulations recommends that universities develop a standard statement for inclusion in all funding proposals "This is a fundamental research project and, as such, the University shall be free to publish or disseminate the results of this research or otherwise treat such results as in the public domain, and it will conduct the research in accord with National Security Decision Directive 189 and the applicable export control implementing regulations." 59 
Self-Regulation
Utilizing a self-regulating framework is a powerful tool for increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency of the current export control regime. Enforcement mechanisms applied internally by space research institutions are more likely to ensure protection of critical military technologies as opposed to a blanket policy that may be too to strict in some areas and too open in others. Furthermore, given the globalization of scientific research initiatives, voluntary agreements constructed with the scientific community instead of national ITAR regulations may stand a better chance of reaching across national borders. In considering the concept of self-regulation by scientists, MIT President Charles Vest offers a positive perspective: "In the war years preceding the development of the atomic bomb, allied scientists stopped publishing research associated with uranium physics, although they continued to discuss the topic privately among themselves. And when recombinant DNA first became possible, leading scientists, led by David Baltimore, established a moratorium on their work, pending open discussion among themselves and a wide range of laypeople to establish standards. Work and open publication proceeded smoothly thereafter. Neither of these examples provides a direct guidance for the less focused situation we face today, but the point is that the scientists themselves, in consultation with many others as appropriate, found an effective path forward." 60 A variety of self-regulating mechanisms might be employed to improve ITAR policy. For example, review boards within research institutions are a common practice to regulate experiments involving human subjects. At MIT, the President of the Institute holds the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects responsible for reviewing every project that utilizes humans as research subjects.
61 This approach could be applied to internally review compliance of research projects with ITAR. First and foremost, a panel with scientific expertise could aid in the review of the proposal statement of work to determine whether the technologies involved in the research are export controlled. In this context, panels with the authority to modify or eliminate information could review critical information flows, such as journal articles submitted for publication. To prevent ITAR issues in the publication phase, institutions might even rely on review boards to approve funding proposal submissions, checking Requests for Proposals for restrictions on publication as well as any mention of export control.
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It is important to note that these self-regulating mechanisms are not intended as substitutes for existing ITAR regulations. Rather, they are proactive measures that, if adopted by space research institutions, might serve to alleviate government concerns regarding the adequacy of existing ITAR measures. By fostering a cooperative working environment with government regulators, scientists are better equipped to lobby against excessive export controls that harm the knowledge sharing critical to innovation. In addition, self-regulation would send a clear signal that the academic research community is genuinely concerned with export control and national security issues. This mutual understanding between the communities serves as a basis for further relationship-building, trust, and clear communication.
VI. Dynamics of Innovation, Technical Superiority, and National Security
Balance must be achieved in the tradeoff between the open transfer of technology and information versus the controlled export of technology and information. This dispute centers on the need for information concerning real and potential risks. As is practiced today, current U.S. export control policy is a manifestation of the precautionary approach to this trade. Arguing against the precautionary principle are proponents of open academic space research, who believe that research should be open to all unless definite proof or risk can be presented. These proponents can be said to adopt the reactionary approach. Based upon the previous discussion, a systems perspective has been taken to understand the competing dynamics present in export control: short term national security gains achieved by limiting arms exports over long-term technological gains achieved through the open exchange of knowledge. This dynamic is shown in Figure 2 as a causal loop of the dynamics of knowledge exchange in the context of ITAR. In causal loop diagrams the positive loops are reinforcing loops or loops that portray reinforcing behaviors. Positive loops tend to display exponential growth behavior. Negative loops are balancing loops and portray retarding behaviors that tend to resist change. 
A. Short-Term Dynamic
In the short term, increasing the restrictions on academic space research can be viewed as an increase in the strength of restrictive ITAR policies. This is intended to reduce the export of sensitive technology and information. Preventing the direct transfer of hardware and knowledge is one way of achieving this objective. These policies are aimed at reducing the export of domestic knowledge in the hopes of leading to a reduction in foreign knowledge generation. As the rate of foreign knowledge generation decreases, the relative U.S. technical superiority increases, thereby reducing concern over national security. This, in turn, would reduce precautionary policymaking as the reasons for it become less salient, eventually leading to more relaxed ITAR policies. Based upon this description, the short term dynamic represents a negative, or balancing, loop with a tendency to maintain U.S. technological superiority at a fixed, constant level. By viewing export control policymaking in this manner, one can infer that the intent of more restrictive policies (driven by the precautionary principle) is to sustain the technological superiority, and therefore national security, of the U.S., by reducing the export of knowledge.
B. Long-Term Dynamic
Long-term scientific progress may be sacrificed for more immediate concerns. The long term effect of restrictive ITAR policies can be seen by examining the causal loop paths for the two remaining branches flowing out of restrictive ITAR policies; "academic freedom for PIs and internationals" and "the influx of foreign researchers". Following these two paths shows that strengthening export control tends to discourage the inclusion of highlyskilled foreign researchers in projects that are deemed as sensitive. As a result, foreign nationals, discouraged from attending U.S. institutions, remain abroad and contribute their skills to increasing the innovation of foreign nations. As foreign knowledge increases, the relative technological superiority of the U.S decreases. In addition to limiting foreign nationals, fear of litigation compels PIs to think twice about engaging in potentially export-controlled research. By limiting academic freedom, researchers find it more difficult to collaborate synergistically, are restricted in their ability to share new areas of knowledge and are therefore less likely to make innovative discoveries. This leads to a reduction in the U.S. pace of innovation, and thus a reduction in U.S. technical superiority. This has an overall negative effect on U.S technical superiority that is self-reinforcing. As the domestic pace of innovation is slowed, foreign nations tend to "catch up" to the U.S. This creates a greater concern for U.S. national security and leads to strengthened export controls, increased support for the precautionary principle, and even more restrictive ITAR policies.
If, on the other hand, export restrictions were lessened or even removed, there would be an increase in domestic innovation concomitant with the decrease in bureaucratic overhead. Supporters of the reactionary approach may argue that an increase in technical superiority may lead to less concern for national security, thus reducing support for the precautionary principle. This self-reinforcing feedback would effectively destroy the U.S. export-control regime, but it would only be sustainable if the U.S. pace of innovation were sufficiently high to maintain continued technical superiority. Support for the reactionary principle leads to a reduction in strength of restrictive ITAR polices, which increases the academic and international scientific freedoms. The net result is the creation of two reinforcing loops; one that promotes the precautionary principle and the other that supports the reactionary principle. These two loops are in conflict with one other, each trying to direct the outcome of U.S academic research and export control polices.
In order for the reactionary approach to gain momentum, the pace of U.S. innovation would need to be extremely high in order to compensate for technology transfer to other nations. Despite the potential long-term increase in innovation, reducing or eliminating export control is not practical and would result in the release of sensitive technology and information in the short-term. This would likely be a viable option only if the United States were to become so technologically inferior to other nations that it had nothing to gain from export controls, particularly given the difficulty in predicting the time-scales of innovation. Although this scenario may appear unlikely, it may provide insight into the lax export control regimes of developing nations.
C. Societal Effects
Beyond the structural dynamics of the innovation process described above, numerous societal and psychological effects have been mentioned that play a role in determining the role of ITAR in space research. These additional dynamics include concerns such as uncertainty on the part of PIs due to ambiguities in the licensing process. These concerns build upon the model shown above.
It is worth noting that there are two major determinants of ITAR interactions. Firstm the strength of the ITAR is influenced by both precautionary and reactionary policymaking. A stronger ITAR will tend to reduce the academic freedom of foreign nationals, thereby reducing technology and information transfer, and tending to maintain technological superiority. This dynamic is counterbalanced by a reduction in domestic innovation, and is further reinforced by increased foreign innovation, both due to the loss of foreign talents to other nations.
The second major determinant of ITAR interaction is a result of incremental policymaking. This tends to reduce the clarity of the ITAR and associated publication policies. This category includes issues such as ambiguities surrounding SBU and FOUO information, lack of consensus regarding the Fundamental Research Exemption, as well as ambiguities stemming from the broad nature of the USML. As discussed previously, decreasing clarity in these policies tends to increase administrative load on research institution officials. This, in turn, adds to administrative delay time. In addition, State Department officials' licensing delay times increase as a consequence of adjustment to new, more complex procedures. These two effects, in combination, create a positive feedback loop that tends to drive license delay time even further up, creating a system that is backlogged with license requests. These delays adversely affect domestic innovation by introducing time lags into the system, creating an incentive for students and researchers to avoid export-controlled topics that might not fit within an academic thesis timeline. In addition, time delays tend to introduce more uncertainty for PIs who wait for licenses that might not arrive for several months. This also has the effect of decreasing domestic innovation while simultaneously creating a disincentive for PIs to work with foreign nationals who might introduce further complication into the process.
Incremental changes to export policy create uncertainty and tend to reduce the clarity of ITAR and associated publication policies. This category includes such issues as ambiguities surrounding SBU and FOUO information, lack of consensus regarding the Fundamental Research Exemption, as well as ambiguities stemming from the broad nature of the USML. As discussed previously, decreasing clarity in these policies tends to increase administrative load on research institution officials. This, in turn, adds to administrative delay time. In addition, State Department officials' licensing delay times increase as a consequence of adjustment to new, more complex procedures. These two effects, in combination, create an additional uncertainty around the whole process. With increased uncertainty around the ITAR process comes added discomfort on the part of academics. As stated before, this leads to a reduction in the perceived freedoms of academic researchers, which in turn reduces in domestic innovation. The end result is that, as uncertainty around ITAR policies increases, U.S innovation from academia decreases, forcing U.S policy makers to keep the current procedures and reinforce the initial behavior. Thus, the uncertainty surrounding the ITAR process helps to support the precautionary principle as the dominant policy driver.
Self regulation of academics institutions with regards to export control issues may provide a partial solution. The effect of university self regulation can be seen in the upper left hand corner of Figure 2 . By increasing university self regulation, uncertainty surrounding the process may be reduced, decreasing the fear of PI litigation. This would increase academic freedom and U.S innovation in turn. At the same time, as uncertainty surrounding the process decreases, fewer violations of export control will occur. As fewer violations occur, the Department of State might begin to trust university self regulation. As the Department of State support increases, clarity would increase concomitantly, thus reinforcing the self regulation loop. If, on the other hand, university self regulation is abused, the resulting effect could be the opposite, namely reduced clarity, increased uncertainty, reduced U.S innovation and reduced support by the Department of State. Therefore, university self regulation has the ability either to aid in the support of academic freedom and the reactionary principle, or can lead to abuse and a decrease in U.S technical superiority, thereby supporting the precautionary principle.
VII. Conclusions
There is clearly a desire for the U.S. to maintain national security in the face of both conventional and asymmetric threats. However, conflict arises in determining how to maintain national security, especially with increasing technological reliance and global commerce, and in particular with respect to space research activities. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations seek to improve national security by limiting the transfer of technology, including knowledge, to potentially hostile adversaries, but must be carefully balanced between precautionary and reactionary approaches to dealing with risk.
Based on the investigation and modeling performed in this paper, ITAR serves a vital purpose in improving national security by protecting against the short term transfer of harmful technology. However, provisions of ITAR that are too strong in preventing knowledge transfer can actually be detrimental to national security, in the long term by hampering innovation and preventing the free exchange of knowledge that is essential to the success of academic space research in an increasingly global society. Yet, it is also necessary to prevent the transfer of technological capability to hostile nations.
To adequately balance the competing needs of domestic technological innovation and national superiority, it is necessary to have a regular and robust dialogue between researchers and policymakers regarding the content of ITAR. Much of the inefficiency inherent in the current regulations results from incremental policymaking without the involvement of space research professionals. Involvement of experts in periodic updating of the USML or training workshops in ITAR compliance would enrich dialogue between different stakeholders in the process and ensure that proper measures are taken to prevent the transfer of harmful innovation.
